Policy Liberalism and Political Institutions by Kim, Chon-Kyun
Policy Liberalism and Political Institutions
Chon-Kyun Kim*
Abstract: This paper examines the impacts of political institutions, especially a
president’s party affiliation and job performance, on the generosity of social
welfare benefits, which are one of the characteristics of policy liberalism,
through an investigation of U.S. social welfare expenditures. Findings indicate
that a president’s party affiliation is a key predictor of his policy preferences,
agendas, and policy liberalism or conservatism despite institutional and political
constraints, whereas a president’s job performance, measured by either success
on congressional votes or job approval, is not linked to the generosity of social
welfare benefits. In an age of global capitalism undergoing radical changes in
the political and economic environment, however, a president’s party affiliation
is not a crucial indicator of policy preferences or policy liberalism/conservatism.
Additionally, political leaders’ policy preferences and tools appear to determine
more significantly the destiny of welfare programs than a president’s job perfor-
mance or economic conditions like unemployment.
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Institutional arrangements generally matter, although the effects of institutional
arrangements on governmental effectiveness and governmental capabilities are contin-
gent (Weaver and Rockman 1993). The U.S. government is based on the separation of
powers and the sharing of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. Compared to other Western developed democracies, particularly parliamen-
tary systems, the U.S. political system makes it more difficult for presidents to achieve
their policy agendas. Under the separation of powers and divided government, a presi-
dent relies on persuasion, bargaining, and coalition building, as Neustadt (1990) point-
ed out. Divided government “exacerbates some problems of governance, especially
the problem of setting priorities” (Weaver and Rockman 1993, 451). Some presiden-
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tial agendas tend to fail, while most represent a constituency’s interests and prefer-
ences. Among the examples of policy failure in the Clinton administration were health
care reform and regulation of cigarette companies.
Is a Democratic president linked to policy liberalism against the backdrop of insti-
tutional and political constraints? Does a president’s job performance or legislative lib-
eralism correlate with policy liberalism? Those research questions are directly or indi-
rectly addressed in this study. The objective of this study is to empirically examine the
relationship between political institutions, especially a president’s party affiliation and
job performance, and policy liberalism through an investigation of U.S. social welfare
expenditures. After reviewing the literature on policy liberalism and political institu-
tions, this study conducts multivariate statistical analyses on social welfare spending,
and analyzes and discusses findings. This study is important in terms of articulating
possible explanations for the linkage between political institutions and policy liberal-
ism and testing the relationships between a president’s party, his job performance, leg-
islative liberalism, and policy liberalism.
PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY LIBERALISM 
AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Policy liberalism differs from classical liberalism and neoliberalism with regards to
the role of government and economic principles. Classical liberalism advocates a min-
imal government that does not intervene in economic matters, arguing that markets
will be sustained by an “invisible hand,” as the classical economist Adam Smith
asserted. Supporting the ideas of classical liberalism, neoclassical liberalism aims to
transform an ineffective economic system through privatization, deregulation, decen-
tralization, and globalization of the capitalist economy, in addition to downsizing or
restructuring government functions and programs. Since the late 1970s, neoliberalism
has become the popular economic ideology in advanced industrial countries, including
the United States and the United Kingdom, where Thatcherism and Reaganism, both
varieties of neoliberalism, emerged as alternatives to the modern welfare state (see
Campbell and Pedersen 2001).
Policy liberalism refers to the extent to which a society adopts liberal policies relat-
ed to social welfare systems, progressive tax structures, fair standards for economic
activities, and protection for racial and gender minorities, disadvantaged people, and
consumers. Historically, the welfare state derives from policy liberalism in which the
government offers relief in cases of social disorder, such as massive unemployment
during the Great Depression of the 1930s (Piven and Cloward 1971). With the positive
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role of government associated with modern liberalism, policy liberalism drives the
government to distribute or redistribute wealth and resources according to need, regu-
late an unjust economic system, and protect disadvantaged people. However, public
choice theorists criticize policy liberalism, which they say leads to an unlimited expan-
sion of government size. Dye (1990) pointed out that the median voter model con-
tributes to overspending and overtaxing and that government size should be reduced
by public choice.
National or state policy liberalism has been explored from several perspectives.
First, state policy liberalism has been discussed with reference to mobilization of
lower-class voters, class bias of the electorate, and state liberalism. Wright et al.
(1987) indicated that state liberalism and citizen preferences are key predictors of state
policy: for instance, the more liberal citizens are, the more the state spends per pupil
on education. Investigating the impacts of public preferences on public expenditures in
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, Soroka and Lim (2003) and
Soroka and Wlezien (2005) found that public preferences are directly linked to public
expenditures on services such as health care. Hill et al. (1995) showed that lower class
voting correlates with generous state welfare policies. Barrilleaux (1997) revealed that
electoral competition, legislative party strength, legislative liberalism, and liberal pub-
lic opinion are associated with state policy liberalism. Hill and Hinton-Anderson
(1995) indicated that lower-class voter mobilization, party competition, elite liberal-
ism, and mass liberalism play a significant role in determining the degree of policy lib-
eralism. However, Ringquist et al. (1997) pointed out that “neither party competition
nor liberal control constitutes the linkage by which lower-class mobilization affects
policy” (p. 344). In the global market system in which capital moves faster across ter-
ritorial borders and countries compete more intensively, public preferences or liberal
public opinion would not be a crucial predictor of policy liberalism.
Second, interest group politics might be a significant factor affecting policy liberal-
ism. For instance, supporting labor, civil rights, and women’s rights, the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, and the National Organization for
Women advocate the interests of their liberal constituents and actively lobby Con-
gress, which contributes to policy liberalism. The various studies on interest groups,
however, have provided little room for presidential autonomy, because elected offi-
cials are regarded as agents of institutional arrangements. In contrast to elitism, plural-
ism tends to relegate political leadership to coordination of interest conflicts.
Finally, political parties significantly affect policy outcomes and the level of liber-
alism. Concerning the impact of political parties on policy outcomes, various studies
have supported the mandate theory. Hibbs (1977) indicated that the government pur-
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sues macroeconomic policies in accordance with the economic interests and prefer-
ences of its class-defined core constituency. For instance, in budgetary and macroeco-
nomic policies, Republican administrations are more likely to increase the defense
budget and control inflation, whereas Democratic administrations tend to increase the
social welfare budget and control unemployment (see Hibbs 1977; Tufte 1978). Those
studies have examined the influence of political parties on government expenditures,
particularly on social welfare and defense. Blais et al. (1993 and 1996) found that left-
wing governments tend to spend a little more than right-wing governments. Boix
(1997) noted that left-wing governments spend heavily on physical and human capital
formation to raise the competitiveness of the economy, whereas right-wing govern-
ments rely instead on the private sector.
The party mandate theory suggests that political parties offer voters different gov-
ernment programs in an election and that the party getting the majority of the votes
carries out its promised programs. In other words, competing parties propose their
own programs to the voters, and the party that attracts the most voters forms a govern-
ment to respond to the needs of its constituency. The party mandate theory links a con-
stituency’s interests and preferences with the behavior of elected public officials.
Budge and Hofferbert (1990) found that although the importance of the party has
declined in American politics, the occupancy of the White House connects party plat-
form emphases to the priorities in federal spending for most areas of human services,
such as education, health, and employment services.
For example, a Democratic administration supports funding for programs that ben-
efit lower-income groups and labor, whereas a Republican administration supports
funding for programs that benefit businesses and upper- and middle-income people. A
president seeks to satisfy his core constituency’s interests and preferences and to
achieve his goals, such as reelection, congressional success, establishment of good
public policies, and historical achievements (Light 1999). Meanwhile, a president’s
party affiliation is an important indicator of his preferences on public programs, bud-
geting, and personnel. Based on strong anticommunism and conservatism, President
Ronald Reagan appointed ideologically pure conservatives to implement his conserva-
tive policies. By contrast, representing the interests of liberal constituents who are
likely to be pro-labor and anti-business, President Barack Obama has pursued liberal
policies such as reforming the health care system and the financial system and reduc-
ing carbon dioxide emissions.
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DATA AND METHODS
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used in this study was policy liberalism. Since policy liber-
alism is a broad term covering various liberal policies, this study focuses on social
welfare programs, such as social insurance, public aid, health and medical programs,
veterans’ programs, and public education and housing. Policy liberalism in this study
was measured as the ratio of yearly total social welfare expenditures across all govern-
ments to gross domestic product. Social welfare expenditures in any one year, howev-
er, are largely a function of expenditures in previous years: in other words, there exists
a serial correlation problem. The autocorrelation or multicollinearity problem in time
series can be minimized through differencing, which is the measurement of the change
between Xt and Xt-1 (see Mill 1990; Gujarati 1988). Accordingly, social welfare
expenditures and gross domestic product are to be differenced. Data on social welfare
expenditures and gross domestic product were obtained from the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services and the Economic Report of the President.
Independent Variables
The independent variables used in this study were president’s party affiliation,
president’s job performance, legislative liberalism, and unemployment, which might
determine the degree of policy liberalism. First, a president’s party affiliation matters
on the grounds that inter-party differences are more significant than intra-party differ-
ences, even if all Democratic presidents have different preferences on welfare pro-
grams (likewise for all Republican presidents). President’s party affiliation is a dummy
variable. The Republican Party was coded as 0 and the Democratic Party as 1.
Second, a president’s job performance, measured by either presidential success on
congressional votes or presidential job approval, could have an impact on policy liber-
alism. Edwards and Wood (1999) examined the president’s success in light of the issue
attention of Congress and the mass media. Congressional votes are likely to be a
buffer on presidential influence. Presidential success on congressional votes was com-
puted by dividing successful votes by all votes. Every vote was given equal weight,
regardless of its actual importance. When a committee kills a bill the president sup-
ports, this goes unrecorded in the vote. Presidential job approval is also measured by
the Gallup poll, in which people are asked whether they approve or disapprove of the
way the president is handling his job, and approvals are divided by the total number of
responses. Presidential job approval ratings are affected by a variety of factors, includ-
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ing macroeconomic conditions, domestic and international events, and the mass
media. Data on congressional votes and presidential approval ratings were obtained
from the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.
Third, legislative liberalism—that is, Democratic control of Congress—could be a
key predictor of policy liberalism in that Democratic control of the House and the Sen-
ate positively affects policy liberalism, whereas Republican control of the House and
the Senate negatively affects it. Democratic control of both the House and the Senate
was coded as 2, Democratic control of either the House or the Senate as 1, and Repub-
lican control of both the House and the Senate as 0. Data on the party control of the
House or the Senate were obtained from the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.
Additionally, the interaction variables between a president’s party and presidential suc-
cess on congressional votes, presidential job approval, or legislative liberalism are to
be established, because there is a possibility that a president’s party affiliation interacts
with his job performance or legislative liberalism and that such an interaction rein-
forces policy liberalism or conservatism.
Finally, unemployment could have a significant impact on policy liberalism,
because high unemployment rates drive the government to increase social welfare
spending. In other words, the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed could
have a direct relationship with policy liberalism. Data concerning unemployment rates
were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. During the period covered by
this study, there were seven presidents (three Democrats and four Republicans) from
Lyndon Johnson through Bill Clinton. Table 1 shows a brief summary of indicators
and measurement for the dependent and independent variables.
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Table 1. Indicators and Measurement
Dependent variable Policy liberalism (ratio of yearly total social welfare expenditures across all 
governments to gross domestic product)
Independent variables 1.  President’s party affiliation 
(Republican presidents coded as 0, Democratic presidents coded as 1)
2.  President’s job performance
a.  Presidential success on congressional votes 
(successful votes divided by all votes)
b.  Presidential job approval (approvals divided by all responses)
3.  Legislative liberalism (Democratic control of both houses coded as 2, 
Democratic control of one house coded as 1, and Republican control of both 
houses coded as 0)
4.  Unemployment (percentage of labor force unemployed)
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Table 2 demonstrates the impacts of a president’s party affiliation and job perfor-
mance, legislative liberalism, and unemployment on social welfare spending. The
findings indicate that Democratic presidents and Democratic control of Congress are
linked to the generosity of social welfare benefits, whereas a president’s job perfor-
mance, unemployment, and the interaction variables between a president’s party and
his job performance or legislative liberalism are not related to social welfare expendi-
tures. Not surprisingly, Democratic presidents and Democratic control of Congress
directly correlate with the generosity of social welfare benefits. Surprisingly, economic
indicators like unemployment rates and a president’s job performance (measured by
either presidential success on congressional votes or presidential job approval) do not
significantly affect social welfare expenditures.
Control by a single party of the presidency and Congress has significant impacts on
policy liberalism or conservatism. Coleman (1999, 821) found that “unified govern-
ment produces greater quantities of significant enactments and is more responsive to
the public mood than is divided government.” Edwards et al. (1997, 545) noted that
“presidents oppose significant legislation more often under divided government.” As
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Table 2. Impacts of Political Institutions on Policy Liberalism
Variables b Sb t
President’s Party .056* .026 2.153
Presidential Success .000 .000 .125
Presidential Approval .000 .000 .103
Legislative Liberalism .012** .004 3.0
Unemployment .001 .000 1.175
President’s Party X Presidential Success .000 .000 .079
President’s Party X Presidential Approval .000 .000 .098
President’s Party X Legislative Liberalism .007 .022 .388
Constant -.044* .018 2.444
Adjusted R2 .184
F (8, 21) = 1.818
Standard Error of Estimate .006
N 34
Note: Unstandardized OLS estimates.
All significance tests are one-tailed: *p<.05, **p< .01
far as funding for social welfare programs is concerned, unified government is more
effective than divided government. Democrats have controlled both the House and the
Senate since World War II except for during the Reagan administration and some
years of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Social welfare expenditures
were likely to decline during Republican control of either the House or the Senate and
during the Reagan years.
Table 2 also indicates that Democratic control of Congress is more significant for
social welfare expenditures than Democratic control of the White House, whereas
Democratic control of the White House has a greater impact on social welfare expen-
ditures than Democratic control of Congress. The slope coefficient of Democratic con-
trol of the White House is .056, and the slope coefficient of Democratic control of
Congress is .012; the p-level of Democratic control of the White House is .045, and
the p-level of Democratic control of Congress is .007. In other words, the level of
funding for social welfare programs is determined by Congress rather than the presi-
dent, because Congress authorizes it even if a president initiates the legislation.
Further, a president’s job performance, measured either by success on congressional
votes or by public approval, is not necessarily linked to funding for public welfare pro-
grams. A Democratic or Republican president’s high success on congressional votes or
high public approval ratings has not necessarily led to greater or lower funding for
social welfare programs. While Johnson and Clinton maintained a relatively high popu-
larity, Johnson significantly expanded welfare programs under a unified government,
and Clinton significantly cut welfare programs under both unified and divided govern-
ments. Most Democratic and Republican presidents have tended to have different levels
of impacts on welfare programs because they have different levels of belief in liberal-
ism or conservatism or because they are affected by different political, social, and eco-
nomic situations. A president’s values, beliefs, and ideology seem to have greater
impacts on welfare programs than a president’s popularity or success.
Unemployment rates are one of the most important economic indicators to which
political leaders should respond through appropriate fiscal or monetary policies.
Unemployment rates were relatively low during the Johnson years, but welfare pro-
grams dramatically expanded during those years. Conversely, unemployment rates
were relatively high during the Reagan years, but many welfare programs were cut
during those years. Economic depression tends to negatively affect reelection, and thus
a chief executive is willing to boost the economy through fiscal or monetary policies,
as a number of studies (for example, Tufts 1978) have suggested. However, the meth-
ods of assisting the unemployed rely on a chief executive’s policy preferences and
tools—for example, utilizing the private sector and local government, utilizing public-
private partnerships, or expanding public welfare programs, as presidents from John-
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son to Obama have shown. Political leaders’ policy preferences and tools for helping
the unemployed can determine the level of funding for welfare benefits, even if politi-
cal leaders’ preferences are constrained more often by citizen preferences.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Past studies on policy liberalism indicate that liberal public opinion, lower-class
voter mobilization, party competition, party mandates, elite liberalism, and legislative
liberalism correlate with policy liberalism (see Wright et al. 1987; Barrilleaux 1997;
Soroka and Lim 2003; Soroka and Wlezien 2005). In the age of global capitalism, in
which capital moves faster across territorial borders and countries compete more
intensively, however, citizen preferences, liberal public opinion, and state liberalism
are not likely to play a key role in determining policy liberalism. Since policy liberal-
ism is a broad term covering various liberal policies, this study has focused on the
generosity of social welfare benefits, which are one of the characteristics of policy lib-
eralism. Also, this study has focused on the extent to which policy liberalism is deter-
mined by a president’s job performance, which is not properly explored in the litera-
ture on policy liberalism, as well as a president’s party affiliation. Linking a con-
stituency’s preferences with the behavior of elected officials, the mandate theory
shows how the occupancy of the White House is related to priorities in federal spend-
ing for most areas of human services (see Budge and Hofferbert 1990). The mandate
theory, however, does not show the extent to which a president’s job performance con-
tributes to policy liberalism or conservatism.
The findings of this study indicate that a president’s party affiliation is a key pre-
dictor of his policy preferences, agendas, and policy liberalism or conservatism,
despite institutional and political constraints, whereas a president’s job performance,
measured by either success on congressional votes or job approval, is not linked to the
generosity of social welfare benefits. Political leaders’ policy preferences and tools
appear to determine the destiny of welfare programs more significantly than a presi-
dent’s job performance or economic conditions like unemployment. As the mandate
theory indicates, a president’s party is one of the key political institutions through
which his core constituency’s preferences and interests are represented by establishing
and budgeting public programs. However, the impact of a president’s party affiliation
on policy liberalism or conservatism is gradually diminishing due to decreasing ideo-
logical and policy differences between the two major political parties, continuously
divided government, and declining trust in government. A president’s party affiliation
is not a crucial indicator of his policy preferences and tools regarding social welfare
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programs in the twenty-first century. Instead, policy tools or alternatives based on
more market-oriented mechanisms rather than party identification are likely to deter-
mine the future of welfare programs.
More importantly, radical changes in the domestic or international political and
economic environment are significantly affecting the relationship between political
institutions and policy liberalism and conservatism. First, the War on Terror has dra-
matically transformed American foreign and domestic policies since 2001, in both the
(George W.) Bush and Obama administrations. Regardless of a president’s party affili-
ation or congressional partisanship, political leaders have focused on fighting domestic
and international terrorists at the expense of freedom, privacy, human rights, lower-
class interests, or constituents’ preferences. Defense and homeland security programs
have been often executed at the expense of social welfare programs during these years.
Second, with the revolution in information technology and the advent of global
capitalism, globalization has significantly changed political and economic principles
and structures that played an important role in maintaining American society for a
long time. No matter what elected officials’ party affiliations or constituents’ interests,
elected officials have been vulnerable to global pressures and forces in which the logic
of capital and markets often prevails over democratic principles and influences the
response to emerging contemporary issues such as climate change, income inequality,
and the need for environmental and ecological protection, clean energy, trade open-
ness, and sustainable development (see Kim 2008).
Third, the economic depression and the national debt have been a huge burden not
only to ordinary people but also to political leaders around the world since the housing
and credit bubble burst. Responding to the global economic and financial crisis, the
Obama administration has focused on reforming the financial system and stimulating
the economy, while the Tea Party, a grass-roots conservative movement, has increas-
ingly appealed to those who prefer lower taxes and small government and has remark-
ably weakened the base of the two major parties’ support. Political actors have no
choice but to adjust to new political and economic circumstances, irrespective of their
ideological differences or policy preferences.
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